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THE RULE OF LAW AT A CROSSROAD: ENFORCING
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT THROUGH THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
JENNIFER M. GREEN*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Rape and forced labor as part of the construction of a natural
gas pipeline project. Medical experimentation on children without
their parents’ consent. Children subjected to both forced labor and
dangerous working conditions. Labor organizers killed for their
attempts to unionize in a mining company. Over the past decade,
questions about the role of multinational corporations in human
rights violations such as these have finally received the world’s
attention.
With the globalization of the world economy, the movement to
hold corporations responsible when they abuse human rights has
also globalized. The worldwide communications revolution now
enables many local activists to publicize human rights abuses
worldwide and to enlist the support of advocates in the
corporations’ home states.
International bodies, regional
organizations, domestic legal systems and corporations themselves
have made significant progress in developing human rights
standards to govern corporate conduct.1
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I was formerly
counsel for the plaintiffs or assisted plaintiffs’ counsel in some of the cases
mentioned in this article: Doe v. Karadzic, Doe v. Unocal, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. I was also counsel for amici curiae in
support of plaintiffs in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, Doe v. Exxon, Flomo v. Firestone, Doe v. Nestle, Giraldo v.
Drummond, and Balintulo v. Daimler, AG, and I submitted an expert declaration
in support of plaintiffs in Jesner v. Arab Bank. My thanks to the Journal of
International Law and the other participants at the outstanding University of
Pennsylvania symposium on international investment and to Ruth Okediji, Hari
Osofsky, Beth Stephens, Paul Hoffman and Agnieszka Fryszman for comments on
this article, to University of Minnesota International Law librarians Mary Rumsey
and Suzanne Thorpe for their important guidance, and to Soren Lagaard for key
research assistance.
1 See,
e.g.,
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Jan. 10,
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The growth of corporate human rights norms was the result of
increasing pressure for corporations to prevent human rights
abuses as well as to provide redress for the victims of human rights
violations they committed. One factor in the development of the
norms was pressure from non-governmental organizations around
the world, including those who brought cases to court to seek the
enforcement of universally accepted human rights standards.
Yet even with all of the development of international norms on
how corporations should behave in the global economy, one of the
biggest challenges continues to be the enforcement of human rights
standards—what penalties corporations pay when they violate the
most fundamental human rights including the prohibitions against
forced labor, torture, genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes, and whether the victims of these abuses can receive any
compensation.
Effective accountability is critical for an
international legal system that rewards law-abiding corporations,
which then contributes to the deterrence of future violations. The
outlier corporations committing the violations such as those
mentioned above have often reacted to human rights lawsuits with
more than just denial of the charges, but have attempted to
undermine the very system of accountability.
My focus here will be one small piece of the attempt to enforce
human rights standards against corporate violators—the claims
brought under a U.S. law, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), and the
recent challenges presented by a Supreme Court case, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Shell. One of the central questions the courts have
begun to address in the wake of the Kiobel decision is to what
extent the human rights practices of U.S. corporations, or foreign
corporations doing significant business in this country, “touch and
concern” the United States.2
The development of this area of jurisprudence is at an
important crossroad, and the next steps by U.S. courts will be
2014);
Voluntary
Principles
on
Security
and
Human
Rights,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2014); BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.businesshumanrights.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); Human Rights Council, Rep. of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31
(Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
2 See infra Sections 4 and 5 (discussing the Kiobel decision and post-Kiobel
cases).
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critical steps—either forward, towards an improved system of
accountability for those who suffer the most egregious human
rights abuses at the hands of corporate violators, or backward,
leaving victims without a remedy, rewarding those companies
who flout the rule of law and penalizing their competitors who
follow the law, and weakening the system of law itself. I will also
discuss how the ATS litigation fits into the global movement to
hold corporations accountable when they violate international
standards on human rights, the need for consistent human rights
standards for companies doing business in the United States and
the importance of a commitment to the rule of law for companies
operating overseas.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE LIABILITY CASES UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE

2.

The Alien Tort Statute is a provision of the First Judiciary Act
of 1789, which provided jurisdiction over claims by aliens for
violations of the “law of nations,”3 today referred to as customary
international law. From the early days of the ATS, the statute
authorized claims against private parties, or “non-state actors,”
such as pirates, for acts occurring on U.S. and foreign territory.4
After a few cases in the 1790s, historical accounts note that the
statute lay dormant for almost 150 years.5 Human rights cases
under the ATS began in the late 1970s, with a case brought on
behalf of the family of Joelito Filartiga, a 17-year-old killed by a
police official because of his father’s political activities.6 In a
groundbreaking decision, sometimes described as the Brown v.
Board of Education of international human rights,7 the U.S. Court of
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
See generally Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (noting that the ATS did not specify types of defendants); William R. Casto,
The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law
of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 221 (1996).
5
See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 nn.15-17
(counting 21 cases between 1789 and 1980). Two early cases were Moxon v. The
Brigantine Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) and Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810
(D.S.C. 1795).
6 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
7
Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
(1991).
3
4
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Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Paraguayan police
official who had fled to New York could be sued in the state
because of the universal prohibition against torture and the U.S.
doctrine of transitory torts, which states that a person cannot
escape liability by fleeing a particular jurisdiction and can be held
liable for a tort wherever that person can be found.8
The Filartiga decision set forth the underlying principle of the
ATS decisions: the cases are part of the attempt to enforce
fundamental human rights: “a small but important step in the
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal
violence.”9 More than just a rhetorical admonition, however, the
Second Circuit conducted a careful, scholarly analysis of the role of
international law in U.S. courts.10
While the Filartiga family sued the police official who
physically tortured Joelito Filartiga, cases in the 1980s and 1990s
held accountable former foreign officials who had command
responsibility for human rights violations, including both military
and civilian leaders. Defendants in these cases include a former
Argentinian general who presided over a campaign of
disappearances and extrajudicial executions of political opponents
during the “dirty war” in 1970s Argentina, former Philippine
dictator Ferdinand Marcos and former Haitian dictator Prosper
Avril in two cases alleging human rights violations against political
opponents, and an Indonesian general who ordered an attack on
peaceful protestors in East Timor.11
In 1995, the Second Circuit took an important step in the postFilartiga line of cases when it held that a leader of the 1990s Bosnian
genocide, Radovan Karadzic, could be sued for violations of
international law, even though Karadzic was a non-state actor (as
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
Id. at 890.
10 Id. at 885; see also McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1843) (discussing
the longstanding nature of transitory tort doctrine and the reparations obligation
for civil wrongful acts transcending national boundaries); Stoddard v. Bird, 1
Kirby 65, 68 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (applying transitory tort doctrine by ATS
author Oliver Ellsworth while a state court judge).
11
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (former military
general responsible for campaign of extrajudicial killings and disappearances
during Argentina’s dirty war); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (former Philippines military dictator); Paul v.
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (former Haitian dictator); Todd v.
Panjaitan, 1994 WL 827111 (D. Mass., Oct. 26, 1994) (former military leader in East
Timor).
8
9
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the self-proclaimed head of territory not recognized as a state by
the international community). The Second Circuit’s holding was
based on a two-pronged analysis. First, for wrongs such as torture,
for which international law requires state action, the state action
requirement can be satisfied if the defendants are complicit with a
state actor.
And second, the Court held, there are some
international law violations whose definition simply does not
require state action, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity.12
This analysis was applied to multinational corporations in Doe
v. Unocal, in which plaintiffs sued California-based Unocal and its
president and chief executive officer for human rights violations
committed in connection with a natural gas pipeline project in
Burma. In 1997, the Central District of California adopted the Kadic
two-pronged analysis, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with their
claims of forced labor, rape and other human rights abuses.13 The
court held that the forced labor claims, as a form of slavery, were
claims for which the international law definition did not require
any state action, and that, for claims such as rape as form of
torture, the state action element was met by the plaintiffs’
allegation of Unocal’s complicity with the military government of
Burma.14 The case was resolved in a confidential settlement in
2004.15
Cases against corporations were highly contested. To survive
motions to dismiss, litigants had to survive numerous hurdles,
such as showing that the case was brought in the most convenient
forum and should not be transferred to a foreign court (forum non
conveniens doctrine),16 the case did not present questions that were
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1995).
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also John Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932
(9th Cir. 2002), on reh’g en banc sub nom.
14
Id. The court followed the careful analysis of Kadic in analyzing what
norms could constitute customary international law, citing U.S. v. Smith and
Paquete Habana.
15 See Historic Advance for Universal Human Rights: Unocal to Compensate
FOR
CONST.
RTS.,
Burmese
Villagers,
CTR.
http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/historic-advanceuniversal-human-rights%3A-unocal-compensate-burmese-villagers (last visited
Mar. 4, 2014) (announcing the settlement in which Unocal agreed to compensate
Burmese plaintiffs who sued the firm for complicity in human rights abuses).
16
See, e.g., Turedi v. Coca-Cola Co., 460 F.Supp.2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(holding that the Court had jurisdiction to dismiss the suit on the basis of forum
12
13
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more appropriately decided by the executive or legislative
branches of government (political question doctrine),17 or that the
case did not challenge the legitimate act of a foreign government
(act of state doctrine).18
Most importantly, the cases that survived motions to dismiss
were those in which the plaintiffs could show a strong link
between the defendants and the alleged human rights violations. It
was never sufficient, in any court, for a plaintiff to argue that a
corporation was merely doing business in a country in which
human rights violations were occurring: the standard required
that the company must be complicit in those violations. This
complicity took the form of either direct participation or the wellrecognized forms of secondary liability such as conspiracy, agency,
alter-ego, and aiding and abetting liability, with the most
commonly accepted (and historically substantiated) standard for
aiding and abetting liability being that the defendant knowingly
provided substantial assistance for the commission of the alleged
human rights violations.19
Plaintiffs alleged direct participation in human rights violations
in Abdullahi v. Pfizer,20 in which family members of Nigerian
children alleged that the Pfizer company had direct liability for the
company’s medical experimentation on the children without their
parents’ consent, and that as a result, eleven children died and
many others were left blind, deaf, paralyzed or brain-damaged.
The initial ATS litigation raised awareness about the issue, and the
Nigerian government then took action, leading to a settlement for
non conveniens).
17 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d 232, supra note 12 (finding that adjudication of this
case was not precluded by the political question doctrine).
18
See, e.g., Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 893, 899 (holding that the act of state
doctrine did not did not preclude consideration of claims based on alleged human
rights abuses by the Burmese government but that the doctrine did preclude
claims based on expropriation of property in Myanmar by the Burmese
government).
19 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) vacated sub nom.;
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 10-56739, 2013 WL 6670945 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013); cf.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) judgment entered sub nom.; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 01 CIV.9882(DLC), 2006 WL 3469542 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2006)
and aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing different standards for aiding
and abetting liability—mens rea of purpose rather than knowledge).
20
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that
medical experimentation without consent violated customary international law,
including standards established at Nuremberg war crimes tribunals).
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the children and family members affected.21 The case also
exemplifies another benefit of ATS litigation, in which the cases
contribute to the development of norms that will help prevent
violations, in this case, the norm against medical experimentation
without consent.22
A number of cases against U.S. military contractors for abuses
in Iraq that include extrajudicial killing and torture have survived
defendants’ motions to dismiss and have settled. For example, a
series of cases were brought against Blackwater for beatings and
shootings, including launching a grenade into a girls’ school and a
massacre which left seventeen Iraqi civilians dead and more than
twenty injured; the case settled in 2010.23 The cases against U.S.
contractors have highlighted these abuses and helped develop
norms both in the United States and led to international action.24
In some cases, plaintiffs alleged both direct and secondary
21
In 2009, Pfizer reached a $75 million settlement with the state of Kano in
Nigeria. Nicole Perlroth, Pfizer Finalizing Settlement in Nigerian Drug Suit, FORBES,
Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/03/pfizer-kano-trovan-businesshealthcare-settlement.html. The civil case resulted in a confidential settlement in
February 2011. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Nigerians Receive First Payments for Children
Who Died in 1996 Meningitis Drug Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/africa/12nigeria.html.
22
According to one scholar, the Abdullahi ruling “should help persuade
international corporations and researchers alike to take informed consent . . .
much more seriously.” George J. Annas, Globalized Clinical Trials and Informed
Consent, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2050, 2053 (2009). See also Danielle Cendrowski,
International Health Law Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute: Federal Appeals Court
Reinstated Lawsuit Under the Alien Tort Statute Against United States Pharmaceutical
Company Pfizer Brought by Nigerian Children and Their Guardians-Abdullahi v. Pfizer,
Inc., 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 233, 236 (2009) (concluding that as a result of Abdullahi,
“pharmaceutical and health care companies must be more cognizant of their
actions in foreign countries that may give rise to potential claims under ATS for
violations of other norms of customary international health law”).
23
See In re XE Serv. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(denying motion to dismiss); In re XE Serv. Alien Tort Litig., Nos. 09-615, 09-616,
09-617, 09-618, 09-645, 09-1017, and 09-1048 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6, 2010) (order of
stipulated dismissal); see also Jarallah v. Xe, No. 09-631, 2009 WL 1350958 (S.D. Cal.
filed Mar. 27, 2009) (discussing a schoolteacher killed by Xe-Blackwater shooters
in Iraq; this case was transferred and consolidated with In re XE Serv).
24
See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 3020.50 CHANGE 1, Aug. 1, 2011,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/DODI_302050_01Aug2011.pdf,
for
U.S. security contractor norms; see the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers (ICoC) organization, http://www.icoc-psp.org/, for
international efforts; see generally Daniel Warner, Establishing Norms for Private
Military and Security Companies, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 106 (2012); Private
Security Companies (PSCs) - Program Support, U.S. DEP’T. OF DEFENSE,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/psc.html.
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liability. One such case was Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., in
which plaintiffs alleged that the parent and subsidiary
corporations and the head of the Shell Nigeria subsidiary were
directly liable because corporate employees bribed witnesses to
give false testimony against Ken Saro-Wiwa, a leader of the
movement against Shell’s exploitation of the environment, and
repressed activists in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.25 The plaintiffs
also brought indirect liability claims that Shell aided and abetted
abuses against plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs and
their family members were “repeatedly arrested, detained and
tortured,” executed after a trial based on “fabricated evidence,”
and that, although “these abuses were carried out by the Nigerian
government and military, they were instigated, orchestrated,
planned, and facilitated by Shell Nigeria under the direction of the
defendants.”26 The court rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss
and found sufficient allegations of defendants’ direct participation
in the human rights violations.27 The case settled in 2009.28
In Doe v. Exxon, Indonesian villagers alleged that the Exxon
Mobil Corporation, as part of a natural gas extraction and
processing facility in the Aceh province of Indonesia, directed
security forces who committed abuses, including killings and
torture, which were actionable under the ATS.29 Both the Court of
Appeals and the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected
defendants’ claims that plaintiffs had not made sufficient
allegations of corporate complicity in the violations, instead
accepting claims that Exxon paid, supported, equipped, trained the
soldiers and provided intelligence to the military,30 and that the
U.S. parent was involved as well as the subsidiary.31
25 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96-8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *2,
9, 25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
26 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
27 Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *12–13.
28 Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June
8,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html.
29 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other
grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
30 Id. at 16.
31 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2008) (Exxon
Mobil Indonesia (EMOI) “alone was not ‘equipped to handle all the issues that
were cropping up’ with security and therefore ‘went up the chain and request[ed]
additional corporate kinds of support’ from Exxon Mobil Corporation—which
enforced ‘uncompromising controls’ over EMOI’s security.”).
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In March 2007, Chiquita Brands International pled guilty to the
felony of knowingly providing material support to the Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a paramilitary organization that it knew
to be responsible for killings and other crimes against Colombian
civilians and designated a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” and a
“Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the U.S. Government.32
The U.S. described Chiquita’s support for seven years of over 100
payments to the AUC as “prolonged, steady, and substantial” in
the Sentencing Memorandum submitted to the District Court and
found, after a full investigation, that “Chiquita’s money helped buy
weapons and ammunition used to kill innocent victims.”33 After
pleading guilty, Chiquita was fined $25 million for violating U.S.
antiterrorism laws.34 In the related civil ATS case, In re Chiquita
Brands, each plaintiff alleged that the Chiquita-supported AUC
terrorist organization attacked his or her relative in Colombia.35
One decedent was reported to have been kidnapped when he was
asleep at home, and then beaten, shot twice, and left for dead.36
The Court found that the facts alleged by plaintiffs in this case
were sufficient to make plausible ATS claims for torture,
extrajudicial killing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.37
In the midst of this developing case law, the Supreme Court
weighed in for the first time in 2004 in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.38 In
the Sosa decision, the Court upheld the Filartiga line of cases and
held that plaintiffs could bring claims for torts that were also
violations of widely accepted, clearly defined customary
international law norms.39 The Executive Branch submitted an
amicus curiae brief arguing that the ATS should not apply to
32
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making
Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine
(Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html.
33
Sentencing Memorandum by the United States, United States v. Chiquita
Brands Int’l, Inc., No. 07-055 (D.D.C. 2007) (filed Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter
Sentencing Memorandum].
34
Colombians Sue Chiquita over Paramilitary Payments, CNN, June 1, 2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/05/31/colombia.chiquita.laws
uits/.
35
In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1307–08 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
36 Id. at 1308.
37 Id. at 1359.
38 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
39
Id. at 724–25 (noting standard generally consistent with Filartiga and
Marcos).
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conduct that occurs on foreign soil, but the Court did not address
that issue.40 Although the case was against an individual foreign
citizen and did not concern corporate liability, various amici
representing trade organizations filed briefs which sought to
eliminate corporate ATS liability, arguing that the cases disrupted
U.S. trade and foreign policy.41 This effort failed, as the Court
chose not to address the question of corporate liability.42
3.

THE ATS AS PART OF THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT FOR CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY

As the ATS litigation against corporate defendants developed,
so also did the global movement for corporate social responsibility,
which included providing remedies for human rights victims.
Opponents have sometimes complained that ATS cases were a
form of “legal imperialism” or that U.S. corporations would be
singled out and lose business to foreign, less ethical, competitors.43
However, the ATS is just one part of the developing
interdependent system for corporate accountability for human
rights abuses.
Many of the cases discussed above came from and were
connected to social movements against human rights abuses, such
as the torture and extrajudicial killing of people because of their
political beliefs and advocacy on issues such as fair labor standards
or a healthy environment. The ATS cases reflected developments
in other countries and in international and regional systems.
International standards, in turn, recognizing the importance of
judicial enforcement mechanisms, incorporated civil litigation
against corporations as an important tool in the implementation of
the developing norms. For example, the most recent international
set of standards, the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on human rights
and transnational businesses, outlined a framework to protect and
respect human rights and provide access to a remedy for
violations. These principles stated that: “Effective judicial
40
Brief of the United States for Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46-50,
Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339, 2004 WL 425376); see also Doe I, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., Defendant., 2003 WL 25625348 (D.D.C.).
41
See, e.g., Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339, 2004 WL 199236).
42 See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
43 See, e.g., Joseph G. Finnerty III and John Merrigan, Legal Imperialism, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 28, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB117263453724421692.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/6

06_GREEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

10/13/2014 11:09 AM

THE RULE OF LAW

1095

mechanisms are at the core of ensuring access to remedy.”44 This
of course builds on the international law norms for the right to a
remedy.45
The Guiding Principles also noted that “States should ensure
that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases from
being brought before the courts where judicial recourse is an
essential part of accessing remedy or alternative sources of
effective remedy are unavailable.”46 The increasing availability of
remedies for survivors of human rights violations is an important
step toward giving meaning to these guidelines.
Important standards have also developed at the international
regional level. One recent example of critical regional action
leading to greater corporate accountability is the 2001 Brussels
regulation on jurisdiction, which requires courts in European
nations to assert jurisdiction over corporations domiciled in
European Union countries.47
In addition, other national governments have implemented
standards and put corporations on trial for human rights abuses.
As noted by Judge Richard Posner in his opinion in Flomo v.
Firestone, corporate tort liability is common around the world.48
Just a few recent examples of national laws and court cases
span the globe. In England, a recent legislative change allowed
foreign direct liability: if the parent company is directly involved
in the subsidiary’s operation or exercises de facto control over
those operations, it owes a duty of care to employees and anyone
affected by the operations.49 Cases in England have resulted in
Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at Annex ¶ 26.
Factory at Chrozow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29
(Sept. 13) (holding “[i]t is a principle of international law, and even a general
conception of law, that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to
make reparation in an adequate form.”); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess.
Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10 (2010); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C. J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5) (noting “[r]esponsibility is the necessary corollary of a right.”).
46 Guiding Principles, supra note 1, ¶ 26.
47
Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1,
available
at
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_coop
eration_in_civil_matters/l33054_en.htm.
48 Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing Paula Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A Comparative Perspective, 31
LEGAL STUD. 684 (2011)).
49
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 1159 (U.K.), available at
44
45
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numerous successful verdicts and settlements for the plaintiffs,50 as
have cases in Australia,51 Argentina,52 Colombia,53 and Ghana.54
Some countries have laws providing for a forum of necessity –
plaintiffs may bring the claims in their domestic courts if there is
no other forum where plaintiffs could reasonably seek relief. A
growing number of countries also allow for the possibility of
corporate criminal liability.55

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf.
50 See, e.g., Chandler v. Cape PLC, No. [2012] EWCA Civ 525, England and
Wales App. (concerning a worker exposed to asbestos in an extinct subsidiary
company who was able to recover from the parent company); Guerrero v.
Monterrico, EWHC 3228 (Q.B.) (2010) (concerning 33 Peruvians protesting copper
mine; the plaintiffs charged corporate complicity in torture and the case ended in
confidential settlement); Landmark Settlement of Miners’ Claims Boosts Fight for
DAY,
Sept.
25,
2013,
Silicosis
Compensation,
LEIGH
http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2013/September-2013/Landmarksettlement-of-miners%E2%80%99-claims-boosts-fight (discussing a settlement by
a mining company to pay South African workers who contracted silicosis).
51
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, CASE PROFILE: BHP LAWSUIT (RE
PAPUA
NEW
GUINEA),
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/
Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/BHPlawsuitrePapuaNewGuine
a (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). Sued in Australia, the mining company BHP was
required to pay AUS$40 million and remove mine tailings from a polluted river in
Papua New Guinea.
52
Argentina: Court Halts Open-Pit Uranium Mine, NUCLEAR MONITOR (WISE),
May 12, 2010, http://www.nirs.org/mononline/nm709.pdf; Court Halts Open-Pit
Mining in Northern Argentina, LATIN AMERICAN HERALD TRIB., Feb. 2011,
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=355944& CategoryId=14093. The
Argentinean Supreme Court halted open pit uranium mining until a transnational
company could show that work would not cause contamination or environmental
damage.
53
Claudia Müller-Hoff, Making Corporations Respond to the Damage They
Cause: Strategic Approaches to Compensation and Corporate Accountability, EUROPEAN
CTR.
FOR
CONST.
&
HUM.
RTS.
(ECCHR)
5,
available
at
http://www.ecchr.de/?file=tl_files/Dokumente/Publikationen/Making%20resp
ond%202012-11.pdf. The Colombian Constitutional Court stopped Muriel Mining
Corporation’s project in areas owned by indigenous and Afro-Colombian
communities.
54
Müller-Hoff, supra note 53, at 5. The High Court of Ghana granted
compensation to victims of forced displacement by Anglogold Ashanti at the
Iduapriem Mine in Ghana.
55 Examples include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom, and
the United States. See Anita Ramasastry and Robert C. Thompson, COMMERCE,
CRIME AND CONFLICT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE
BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of
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The Alien Tort Statute has been an important tool for victims of
corporate human rights abuses to obtain some redress, particularly
when there is a U.S. corporation involved, and it is an important
part of a growing system of consistent, enforceable corporate
human rights standards to provide victims redress, punish
violators and prevent continued abuses. International standards
such as the Guiding Principles suggest that courts or other
segments of the U.S. governments shall not “erect barriers to
prevent legitimate cases from being brought to court.”56 In 2011,
however, a new challenge arose for victims seeking to sue
corporations under the ATS.
4.

KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH: A CORPORATE ATS CASE AT THE
SUPREME COURT

In 2011, the ATS again reached the U.S. Supreme Court, this
time in a case against a corporate defendant.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was filed in 2002 by twelve
Nigerians who sued Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport
and Trading (Shell) for torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and
crimes against humanity during the mid-1990s, charging Shell with
complicity with the military dictatorship in Nigeria.57 Because of
this treatment, they had sought and been granted political asylum
in the United States.58 In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, without prior briefing or argument on the issue,
ruled that corporations could not be sued under the ATS.59
Three subsequent courts of appeals—the Seventh Circuit, the
D.C. Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit—ruled that the ATS permits
suits against corporations for universally condemned human rights
violations (and rulings by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit have been interpreted to stand for the principle of corporate
accountability under the ATS.).60
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1493-1500; see also Flomo, 643
F.3d at 1018-20.
56 Guiding Principles, supra note 1, at Annex ¶ 26.
57 The Kiobel case was originally a companion case to Wiwa, discussed earlier,
but the two cases were separated after dismissal of one of the claims in Kiobel led
to an interlocutory appeal. While the Kiobel appeal was pending, Wiwa settled.
See Mouawad, supra note 28.
58
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
59
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
60 Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); Aziz v. Alcolac,
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The Supreme Court granted the Kiobel plaintiffs’ petition for
certiorari on the question of corporate liability under the ATS. The
case was highly contested: 19 amicus briefs were submitted in
support of the Kiobel plaintiffs (Petitioners) and 16 amicus briefs
were submitted in support of the Shell defendants (Respondents).
A broad range of briefs submitted in support of Petitioners
included briefs by survivors of human rights violations, scholars, a
former U.S. senator, former military officials, former U.S.
counterterrorism officials, former U.S. diplomats, United Nations
officials, a Nobel-prize winning economist, and German Members
of Parliament.
Respondents’ amici included a number of
corporations and corporate trade organizations, selected
governments, as well as scholars.61
In their briefs, Respondents and many of their supporting amici
In
aimed to eliminate corporate ATS liability altogether.62
commenting on this strategy, the United Nations Special
Representative on Human Rights and Business, Harvard Professor
John Ruggie, asked, “Should the litigation strategy aim to destroy
an entire juridical edifice for redressing gross violations of human
rights, particularly where other legal grounds exist to protect the
company’s interests?”63
Another question was how the Court would rule so soon after
its ruling in Citizens United granting corporations first amendment
rights64—if corporations had these types of rights, did they also
have responsibilities to comply with human rights standards?65
Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1013; Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2007), on reh’g en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
61
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659. For a compilation of all briefs filed in the case,
see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: SCOTUSblog Coverage, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter SCOTUSblog].
62 See SCOTUSblog, supra note 61 (including Brief for Respondents Kiobel, 133
S. Ct. (No. 10-1491)); Brief for BP America et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. (No. 10-1491); Brief for Chevron Corp. et al., as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. (No. 10-1491)); Brief for
KBR, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. (No.
10-1491); Brief for Rio Tinto Grp. & Occidental Petroleum Corp., as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. (No. 10-1491).
63
John G. Ruggie, Issues Brief, Kiobel and Corporate Social Responsibility,
HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., Sept. 4, 2012, at 6.
64 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
65 See Beth Stephens, Are Corporations People? Corporate Personhood Under the
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After argument, the Court took the unusual step of ordering
briefing on a separate issue:
“whether and under what
circumstances the [Alien Tort Statute] allows courts to recognize a
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”66
That question was briefed; again, multiple amici weighed in. In
April 2013, the Court issued its decision. The attempt to eliminate
corporate liability under the ATS failed. Instead, the Court
introduced a new standard for ATS cases, based on the “principles
underlying the canon of interpretation” of a presumption against
the extraterritorial application of “an Act of Congress regulating
conduct.”67
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the application of the transitory
tort doctrine to ATS cases and devoted much of the majority
opinion to a discussion of concerns about the foreign policy
implications that arise when courts decide cases involving acts
which occurred on foreign soil (to explain why it invoked the
“principles underlying the canon” on extraterritoriality, since the
canon on extraterritoriality itself had not been applied to statutes
such as the ATS, which the Court’s earlier decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez Machain, had ruled to be jurisdictional).68 Notably, the
majority did not overrule Sosa, which allowed a foreign plaintiff to
sue for acts on foreign soil.69
The majority opinion and the three separate concurring
opinions raised a number of questions which continue to be
litigated. In Part IV of its decision, the majority applied its
Constitution and International Law, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2013) (comparing the
reasoning of the Citizens United and Kiobel courts); see also Harold Hongju Koh,
Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 263, 265 (2004) (“If corporations have rights under international law, by
parity of reasoning, they must have duties as well.”).
66 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. For the text of the grant of certiorari, see Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
67
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. The court referred to the “canon of
interpretation” because, as it specified, the presumption itself was limited such
that the extraterritorial application was not a question of jurisdiction but rather
was a “merits question.” Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.
Ct. 2869, 2876–77 (2010)).
68 Id. at 1663–69.
69
Id. at 1663 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714, 724 (2004))
(“[T]he First Congress did not intend the provision to be ‘stillborn.’ The grant of
jurisdiction is instead ‘best read as having been enacted on the understanding that
the common law would provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of
international law violations.’”).
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extraterritoriality test to the Kiobel plaintiffs’ allegations and issued
its narrow conclusion: “On these facts, all the relevant conduct
took place outside the United States.”70 The Court then broadened
its analysis with the following: “And even where the claims touch
and concern the territory of the United States they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and
it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices.”71
This short paragraph has prompted many questions from
courts, plaintiffs, defendants, and scholars, including what conduct
is sufficient to “touch and concern” the United States “with
sufficient force” to allow claims, and what “mere corporate
presence” is insufficient to allow a claim to proceed.72
Contributing to the debate, Justice Kennedy joined the majority
opinion but also wrote a separate opinion noting that the Court
was “careful to leave open a number of significant questions
regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”73
Justice Kennedy indicated that some (unspecified) claims may
proceed under the ATS:
[C]ases may arise with allegations of serious violations of
international law principles protecting persons, cases
covered neither by the [Torture Victim Protection Act] nor
by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those
disputes the proper implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial application may require some
further elaboration and explanation.74
A concurrence by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas,
offered further indication that the Kiobel decision did not eliminate
the ATS as an avenue for plaintiffs to seek redress for claims where
conduct occurred overseas.75 Justice Alito stated that he wrote
Id. at 1669.
Id. (citation omitted).
72 See, e.g., An Hertogen, Kiobel Insta-Symposium Insta-Roundup, OPINIO JURIS
(Apr. 18, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/18/kiobel-instasymposium-insta-roundup/ (aggregating all of the site’s posts by academics
regarding the Kiobel decision); SCOTUSblog, supra note 61 (providing links to
several commentaries on the Kiobel decision).
73 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring).
70
71
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separately to “set out the broader standard . . . that this case falls
within the scope of the presumption.”76 That “broader standard,”
which he and Justice Thomas preferred, would have required that
an ATS claim be barred “unless the domestic conduct is sufficient
to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized
nations.”77
Justice Breyer wrote yet another concurring opinion which also
noted that the majority opinion left many issues unresolved.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, this opinion
noted that the ATS basic purpose is to provide compensation for
victims of “today’s pirates” (meaning both those committing acts
of piracy as well as other universally condemned human rights
abuses) and that other countries permitted plaintiffs to sue for
human rights violations.78 This concurrence suggested that these
justices would displace the Kiobel majority’s “presumption” where
“the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe
harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind.”79
The question of which claims may proceed under the Kiobel
standard is still being sorted out by the lower courts, and litigation
on these questions is expected for the next several years.
5.

THE INITIAL ROUND OF POST-KIOBEL CASES

An initial series of cases, almost all by district courts, quickly
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims based on the doctrine of
extraterritoriality. Some provided little or no analysis of the
Supreme Court’s opinion; in others, the analysis misstated the facts
or treated Justice Alito’s “broader” test on extraterritoriality as if it
were the majority opinion. In a more recent series of decisions, the
courts have expanded their analysis of the Kiobel opinion and
begun to analyze the majority’s “touch and concern” test. These
latter cases have led to decisions which have emphasized the
importance of accountability for human rights violations.

76
77
78
79

Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1671–72 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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For example, in June 2013, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed plaintiffs’ claims in Al
Shimari v. CACI International. The case was brought by four Iraqi
civilians against a U.S. contractor for torture, war crimes, and
inhuman treatment in the notorious Abu Ghraib prison under U.S.
control.80 The plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees directed
soldiers in torture and mistreatment including the use of
unmuzzled dogs and beatings81 and that the corporation ignored
reports of abuse, praised or promoted employees implicated in the
abuse, and attempted to cover up the misconduct in order to
continue its contract.82 The court stated that it dismissed the claims
because the “tort claims occurred exclusively in Iraq, a foreign
sovereign.”83
The Al Shimari opinion mistakenly read Kiobel as a blanket
prohibition and erred in its broad statement that “Kiobel rejected
the extraterritorial application of the ATS.”84 As explained above,
such a categorical bar was the position of the self-described
“broader” test proposed by Justice Alito in his concurring opinion
(joined only by Justice Thomas), rather than the Kiobel majority.85
The Al Shimari court failed to apply the “touch and concern”
analysis of the majority opinion, which requires an assessment of
the U.S. interests at stake: in Al Shimari, a U.S. corporation (making
decisions in the United States) violated a norm that the U.S. has
espoused (the prohibition against torture) in a facility controlled by
the United States. The Al Shimari opinion even acknowledged that
the Kiobel decision “may be interpreted by some as leaving the
proverbial door ajar for courts to eventually measure its width.”86
However, among other errors, the District Court interpreted the
Kiobel “presumption” as “only rebuttable by legislative act,” a
standard which the Supreme Court itself did not articulate.87
Plaintiffs have appealed that case to the Fourth Circuit, supported

80 Complaint, Al Shimari v. CACI, Int’l. Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (No.
2:08-cv-637), available at http://ccrjustice.org/Al-Shimari-v-CACI.
81 Id. ¶¶ 18, 81–83, 87–88, 103, 116, 119–25.
82 Id. ¶¶ 146, 148, 149, 152, 157.
83 Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 858 (E.D. Va. 2013).
84 Id. at 864.
85 For a discussion of Alito’s concurrence in Kiobel, see supra notes 75–77 and
accompanying text.
86 Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
87
Id. at 866.
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by a number of amici curiae.88
In July 2013, a district court in Alabama dismissed a case
against Drummond, a mining company based in Alabama.89
There, the plaintiffs had alleged that the head of Drummond took
actions in Alabama that involved funding terrorists in Colombia
who murdered union activists.90 In its ruling on defendants’
motion for summary judgment of the case, the court ruled that
there was no admissible evidence that the U.S.-based Drummond
corporation made decisions in the United States.91 Plaintiffs have
challenged the court’s analysis including the exclusion of evidence
and appealed to the Eleventh Circuit; as of this writing, both
argument and a decision are pending.92
In a case against three U.S. corporations for aiding and abetting
South Africa’s apartheid regime, plaintiffs alleged that IBM, Ford,
and Daimler supplied computers for the main mechanisms
supporting apartheid—for the pass system, to track dissidents, and
to target particular individuals for repressive acts—and supplied
vehicles for the police and military used to commit human rights

88 See Al-Shimari v. CACI et al., CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/AlShimari-v-CACI (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (providing links to all amicus briefs
supporting the plaintiffs). As this article was going to press, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed the lower court’s dismissal.
The Circuit held that the lower court had misread the Kiobel decision, and should
have considered CACI’s substantial U.S. connections. Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier
Technology, Inc., No. 13-1937 (4th Cir. June 30, 2014).
89 Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at
*9–*10 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013).
90 Id. at *2–*3.
91 Id. at *8.
92 There are other cases which dismiss plaintiffs’ claims based on Justice
Alito’s concurrence rather than the majority opinion. For one example, see
Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *2 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Although the majority failed to adopt a particular test
regarding the ‘touch and concern’ standard, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ claim
would fail under either formulation proposed by the concurring opinions.”). The
Tymoshenko court fails to note that both the Alito and Breyer concurrences state
that they are advocating different standards than the majority, and Justice Alito
notes that his standard is “broader.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring). A second case invoking the blanket
standard advocated by Justice Alito’s concurrence is Muntslag v. D’Ieteren, SA.,
No. 12-cv-07038 (TPG), 2013 WL 2150686, *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013) (misstating
the holding of the court and instead asserting a standard more along the lines of
Justice Alito’s opinion: “The court held that the ATS does not provide the federal
courts of the United States with subject matter jurisdiction over torts that occur
outside of the United States.”).
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violations.93 The case was before the Second Circuit on a writ of
mandamus and the collateral order doctrine, but the court
sidestepped the limited procedural posture and instead wrote a
substantive opinion about Kiobel.94 The August 2013 opinion did
not consider the actions that plaintiffs alleged had occurred on U.S.
territory, including defendants’ affirmative steps in the United
States to circumvent the domestic and international sanctions
regime which barred all sales of commodities to apartheid security
forces and the provision of technical data for use by apartheid
security forces.95 Instead, once again, the court applied the
standard set forth in the concurrence by Justice Alito.96 After the
Second Circuit’s remand, the District Court ordered briefing on
whether corporations are liable under the Alien Tort Statute.97
More recently, however, there have been a number of
significant post-Kiobel rulings that have allowed plaintiffs to
proceed with their claims. An April 17, 2014 decision in the
Apartheid case held that corporations can be liable under the ATS,
and allowed plaintiffs to make a preliminary showing to satisfy the
Kiobel test on extraterritoriality.98
In another case with a corporate defendant, Doe v. Nestle,
brought on behalf of child labor victims in the Ivory Coast, a
December 2013 Ninth Circuit decision reversed the district court’s
pre-Kiobel dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.99 The Circuit held that
the question of whether the alleged acts “touch and concern” the
United States was a question of fact and remanded the case to
allow plaintiffs to amend the complaint to deal with this
question.100 On the question of corporate liability, the court cited
Kiobel as “suggesting in dicta that corporations may be held liable
under the ATS,” and further cited the analyses in three cases,
including a prior Ninth Circuit ruling, which provided lengthy and
scholarly analyses of corporate liability under the ATS: Sarei v. Rio

Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 188–91.
95 Id. at 193–94.
96 Id. at 191 n.26, 191–93.
97
Order, In re South African Apartheid Litigation, No. 1:02-md-01499-SAS
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013).
98
In Re: Apartheid Litigation, No. 1:02-md-01499 -SAS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17,
2014).
99
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013).
100 Id.
93
94
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Tinto, Doe v. Exxon and Flomo v. Firestone.101 The Nestle court
reversed the lower court’s requirement that the plaintiffs allege
specific intent for the applicable mens rea standard, and instead
held that the test was whether defendants had provided assistance
that had a substantial effect on the commission of the human rights
violations.102
In a case with an organization as a defendant, Mwani v. Bin
Laden and Al Qaeda, plaintiffs alleged harm resulting from
defendants’ 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya.103 The
judge noted that he requested briefing from both parties because
the “case is between foreign nationals and a foreign group for
events that occurred in Nairobi, Kenya.”104 The District Court for
the District of Colombia rejected defendants’ motion to dismiss the
case based on the Kiobel ruling on extraterritoriality.105 The court
noted that the Kiobel decision had left open a “narrow[] avenue for
jurisdiction over acts that occurred outside the United States.”106 It
focused on the majority’s analysis of the Kiobel plaintiffs’
allegations, interpreting the opinion as “suggesting that in some
limited instances, an act occurring outside the United States could
so obviously touch and concern the territory of the United States
that the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS
is displaced.”107 The Mwani court highlighted plaintiffs’ allegations
that the foreign defendant took overt acts in furtherance of
conspiracy in the United States, and that U.S. national interests
were involved because the acts “were directed at the United States
government, with the intention of harming this country and its

101
Id. (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669
(2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same), vacated
on other grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber
Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671
F.3d 736, 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that corporations may be liable
under ATS), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995.
102
Nestle, 738 F.3d at 1049 (rejecting Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) and endorsing the
standards set forth in Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-01-A,
Judgment, ¶ 475 (Special Court of Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013) and Prosecutor v.
Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 36, n.97, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013)).
103
Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
104
Id. at 3.
105
Id. at 5–6.
106
Id. at 4.
107
Id.
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citizens.”108 The Mwani decision is now on appeal.
One detailed analysis of the question of extraterritoriality
occurred in a case against a man living in Massachusetts, Sexual
Minorities of Uganda v. Scott Lively.109 The defendant in this case
was alleged to have planned and managed a decade-long
campaign to cause physical harm to the LGBT community in
Uganda. The judge found that the level of persecution amounted
to a crime against humanity.110
In analyzing the Kiobel
extraterritoriality “principles,” the judge highlighted that Lively
was a U.S. citizen, that his campaign against the Ugandan LGBT
community was conducted “to a substantial degree within the
United States”;111 and the court highlighted the defendant’s
nationality and location in concluding that “[a]n exercise of
jurisdiction under the ATS over claims against an American citizen
who has allegedly violated the law of nations in large part through
actions committed within this country fits comfortably within the
limits described in Kiobel.”112
The analysis of the defendant’s ties to the United States is also
appropriate for cases against U.S. corporations: U.S. corporations
are citizens of the United States and conduct “substantial” portions
of their activity in the United States.
The Sexual Minorities Uganda decision also concluded that to
hold the defendant accountable would produce no negative foreign
policy implication; to the contrary, there might in fact be negative
foreign policy concerns if the defendant were to face no
consequences for his actions:
Indeed, the failure of the United States to make its courts
available for claims against its citizens for actions taken
within this country that injure persons abroad would itself
create the potential for just the sort of foreign policy
complications that the limitations on federal common law
are aimed at avoiding. Under the law of nations, states are
obligated to make civil courts of justice accessible for claims
of foreign subjects against individuals within the state’s
Id. at 5.
Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-CV-30051-MAP, 2013 WL
4130756 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013).
110
Id. at *7.
111
Id. at *13 (“[T]ortious acts committed by Defendant took place to a
substantial degree within the United States.”).
112 Id. at *14.
108
109
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territory.113
The court cited to an earlier opinion by a U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia judge in emphasizing that “[i]f the court’s
decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone
the original wrongful act, under the law of nations the United
States would become responsible for the failure of its courts and be
answerable not to the injured alien but to his home state.”114 The
court also cited an event in the early history of the ATS, in which
U.S. citizens who joined a French privateer fleet to aid the French
in their war against Great Britain—despite an official American
policy of neutrality—could be held civilly liable under ATS. Since
the issue could be resolved by way of a civil suit, this may have
avoided an international conflict and diffused tensions between the
United States and Great Britain. 115
The analysis of the Sexual Minorities Uganda decision can be
applied to U.S. corporations: to further U.S. foreign policy interests
such as the rule of law and the enforcement of human rights
standards, U.S. corporate citizens should be held accountable when
they violate U.S. and international law, in order to prevent
negative foreign policy implications.116
A number of other cases are pending, including Doe v. Exxon117
and the above-mentioned Chiquita and Drummond appeals.118
Another case in which there is a pending appeal is Mujica v.
Occidental,119 in which plaintiff alleged that a bomb dropped by the
Id.
Id. (quoting Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)).
115 Id. (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 57 (1795)).
116
The court specifically dismissed the reasoning in the Al Shimari case as
“unpersuasive.” See id. at *15 n.8 (“Arguably a different rationale may apply to a
natural U.S. citizen than an American corporation. If not, this court finds the
reasoning in Al Shimari unpersuasive.”). See also Ahmed v. Magan, 2:10-cv-00342,
2013 WL 4479077 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013), report and recommendation adopted,
2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 5493032 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013) (holding there was no
issue of extraterritoriality where defendant was a permanent resident of the
United States).
117
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc
dismissed (July 26, 2013) (affirming claims for wrongful death, assault and battery
and negligent supervision and remanding ATS claims for further consideration).
118
For more on these cases, see supra notes 33–37 (Chiquita), 89–91
(Drummond), and accompanying text.
119 Mujica v. Occidental, Nos. 10-55515, 1055516 & 10-55587 (pending in 9th
Cir.). Ninth Circuit oral argument was held on March 5, 2014. See Oral
Argument, Mujica v. Occidental (Nos. 10-55515, 1055516 & 10-55587), available at
113
114
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military of Colombia killed his mother, sister, and cousin; he also
alleges that the Colombian armed forces in question were funded
by Occidental Petroleum Corporation, that the intelligence for the
bombing was provided by Occidental, and that the bombing was
planned in Occidental’s complex.120
Several of these cases also raise questions beyond the issue of
“extraterritoriality,” including debates over the standard of
corporate complicity required to hold the defendants liable in U.S.
courts. The first post-Kiobel case to rule on this issue, Doe v. Nestle,
found the correct standard to be that a company must have
knowledge of the human rights abuse and continue to aid and abet
the violation.121 In the Second Circuit, the courts are re-examining
the circuit’s Kiobel ruling which held that corporations are not
responsible under international law and therefore cannot be
defendants in ATS cases. As mentioned above, the Southern
District of New York held that, inter alia, in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kiobel, corporations may in fact be sued under
the ATS, but the Circuit itself has not yet addressed the issue.122
As the above analysis indicates, there are still many unresolved
questions and opportunities for plaintiffs to proceed with claims
after the Kiobel ruling. And, within the United States, there are
other statutes which offer human rights victims possible remedies
for plaintiffs besides the ATS.
One additional federal statute which allows plaintiffs to raise
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000012431. One issue
in the Occidental case is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman,
No. 11-965 (Jan. 14, 2014), which held that a defendant was subject to general
jurisdiction for ATS cases only if the defendant was “at home” within the state.
120
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (C.D.
Cal. 2005).
121
Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Nestle,
S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated sub nom. I was counsel for
amicus curiae Nuremberg Scholars in support of plaintiffs, who concluded that
the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunals after the Second World War used a
knowledge standard for aiding and abetting liability. Brief of Amici Curiae
Nuremberg Scholars et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Reversal, at
19–32, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-56739).
122 In re South African Apartheid Litigation, supra note 98. See also Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC, No. 06-CV-3869(NG)(VVP), 2009 WL 4663865 (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
2009) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS,
and, instead of addressing the extraterritoriality question, stating that the law of
the Second Circuit was that plaintiffs could not bring claims against corporations
under the ATS; the case is now on appeal to the Second Circuit, Jesner v. Arab
Bank, No. 13-3605-cv (L)).
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human rights claims against multinational corporations is the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act.123 Under this statute, survivors
of human trafficking may bring claims for the trafficking and other
human rights abuses which are part of the trafficking, such as
sexual violence or arbitrary detention, but the law is limited to
provide remedies only to victims of trafficking.124 A statute
providing opportunities for redress for acts of terrorism is the AntiTerrorism Act.125
Another possible avenue for plaintiffs is to bring claims in state
courts for torts such as wrongful death, assault and battery, and
negligent supervision. A number of plaintiffs in ATS cases have
also brought state tort claims; one example where state claims are
pending is Doe v. Exxon.126
ATS cases, as well as the other U.S. federal and state laws
which offer human rights victims the opportunity to bring claims
for redress continue to contribute to the growing system of
corporate human rights accountability.
6.

CONCLUSION

In a time of increasing globalization of corporate activity, cases
in the United States, as well as those in other national systems,
have been important steps forward in a growing system of
accountability for outlier corporations which violate human rights.
Holding these violators accountable contributes to what has been
called the “double bottom line”: the bottom line of compliance
with human rights standards as well as the traditional bottom line
of maximizing financial profits.127
The United States has a long tradition of passing and
implementing laws designed to control corporate excess. Parallel
developments in the United States over the past century include
the antitrust laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries128 and the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act in the 1970s.129
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–12 (2012).
Id.
125
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214.
126 Paul Hoffman and Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under
State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 16 (2013).
127 Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect
Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 767
(2009).
128 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012); Federal
123
124
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These laws were passed to both punish and prevent violations and
to create a fair system for law-abiding businesses. Similarly, ATS
suits seek to promote corporate social responsibility based on
international human rights norms and reaffirm prohibitions such
as those against forced labor, genocide, war crimes, torture,
extrajudicial killing, and crimes against humanity, which are wellestablished violations of international law.
The burden on law-abiding businesses to avoid involvement in
gross human rights abuses is similar to the burden of avoiding
criminal or fraudulent conduct. For example, the well-accepted
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants requires
that, in order to avoid harsh sentences, companies must have
rigorous due diligence programs to avoid involvement in criminal
misconduct.130 Similarly, UN Guiding Principle 23(c) provides that
companies should “[t]reat the risk of causing or contributing to
gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever
they operate.”131
In the Seventh Circuit decision in Flomo v. Firestone, Judge
Posner noted that the ATS might level the playing field for ethical
companies:
One of the amicus curiae briefs argues, seemingly not
tongue in cheek, that corporations shouldn’t be liable under
the Alien Tort Statute because that would be bad for
business. That may seem both irrelevant and obvious; it is
irrelevant, but not obvious. Businesses in countries that
have and enforce laws against child labor are hurt by
competition from businesses that employ child labor in
countries in which employing children is condoned. 132
Nobel-Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has stressed that the
ATS is an important means to improve business standards because
it gives corporations an incentive to police their own conduct and
to promote development and foreign direct investment.133 World
Trade Commission Act 1914, 15 U.S.C §§ 41-58 (2012); Sherman Act of 1890, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
129 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
130
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2013), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/8b2_1.htm.
131 Guiding Principles, supra note 1, ¶ 23(c).
132 . Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011).
133
Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6,
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (No. 11-88).
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Bank studies have shown that respect for human rights is
associated with an economy’s performance.134
The ATS is a limited statute, allowing plaintiffs to bring claims
for the most egregious human rights violations.
Where
corporations are complicit in those violations, liability rules
provide carefully drawn standards for when plaintiffs can hold
liable corporations and/or their officers. The cases brought under
the statute have drawn upon and contributed to the international
standards intended to prevent and provide remedies for corporate
human rights abuses.
The ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum are still unknown and the courts and parties
in ATS cases face an important challenge: will the nation’s
pronouncements on the importance of human rights and the rule
of law be applied to corporations who violate the most
fundamental of human rights? Will the courts contribute to a
system of law which reins in the most egregious violations
committed by corporate actors?
Or, will they contribute to a
system of loopholes which allow corporations to argue that a
corporation headquartered in the United States, doing business in
the United States, benefitting from U.S. laws, or all of the above,
should not have to comply with laws seeking to prevent and
punish human rights violations?

134
Id. at 13 (citing Jonathan Isham, et al., Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the
Performance of Government Projects, 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 219 (1997)).
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